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Sexual Psychopathy-A Legal Labyrinth
of Medicine, Morals and Mythology
In 1949, the Nebraska Legislature crystallized the public con-
cern over sex offenders by adopting a Sexual Psychopath Statute.'
In so doing, Nebraska joined a trend which has grown to include
about half of the forty-eight states.2 The Statute embodies the theory
that the sex offender presents a medical, as well as a legal, problem.
Such legislation is predicated on the theory that the sex offender
can be recognized and treated3 and that therefore he should be in
a mental hospital rather than in a prison.4 The Nebraska Statute
provides that a person found to be a sexual psychopath may be
committed to a state hospital for an indefinite period of time.
Elaborate procedural safeguards were provided in the face of the
extended periods of confinement which may accompany such com-
mitment.r It is the purpose of this article to assess the impact of the
INeb. Rev. Stat. §29-2901 et seq. (Reissue 1956).
2 See California Dept. of Mental Hygiene and The Langley Porter Clinic,
California Sexual Deviation Research 41-58 (March 1954) for a synopsis
of the sexual psychopath laws of twenty-three states and the District of
Columbia. (Hereinafter cited as California Sexual Deviation Research.)
3 Reinhardt and Fisher, The Sexual Psychopath and the Law, 39 J. Crim.
L., C. & P.S. 734, 741 (1949).
4Report of the Committee on Crime and Delinquency Prevention, 28
Neb. L. Rev. 215, 219 (1949).
5 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-2902-04 (Reissue 1956). The petition charging
sexual psychopathy must be verified by a person with knowledge of the
facts. The defendant has an absolute right to counsel. The findings of
the court-appointed physicians must be served on the defendant's counsel
and the physicians are subject to cross-examination. The trial is by jury un-
less waived. The burden of proof is on the state to show that the individual
is a sexual psychopath beyond a reasonable doubt. Except that evidence
of prior conduct is admissible, and that the question is whether the de-
fendant is a sexual psychopath, the trial procedure is the same as in crim-
inal cases.
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Statute in Nebraska and to determine if it is meeting those problems
which it set out to solve.
Current indications point to some dissatisfaction with the Stat-
ute. Recent efforts have been made to broaden the definition of
a sexual psychopath. At the 1955 session of the legislature, a meas-
ure designed to facilitate commitments was adopted.7 Morevover,
there is evidence of a feeling within certain segments of the public
that still further measures need be taken to "put away" sex of-
fenders.8 At the same time, however, the reports of the Nebraska
Bar Association indicate a shift of emphasis within the legal pro-
fession. The Committee on Crime and Delinquency Prevention in
1948 and 1949 was chiefly concerned about the increase in sex crimes
and the need for new laws to protect society from the sex offender.9
In 1955, however, this Committee's report indicates that the legal
profession thinks some of the clamor over sex offenses may be due
to "hysteria."10 This report places more emphasis on the duty of
the legal profession to maintain perspective and balance, not only
recognizing the need of punishing or treating sex offenders, but also
emphasizing the necessity of protecting individual rights. 11
Against such a background, this comment was undertaken to
set out concisely the problems arising under the Statute. A great
deal of the research material upon which this report is based was
gathered from primary sources, such as the hospital files of in-
dividuals committed as sexual psychopaths, personal interviews with
county attorneys involved in handling commitment procedures,
and penitentiary records. The information gained from these and
other sources is set out in four sections: (1) Identifying the Sexual
6 See L.B. 84 and 85, Neb. Legis. 67th Sess. (1955).
7 Neb. Laws c. 107, § 1 (1955); see Statement of Judiciary Committee on
L. B. 542, Neb. Legis. 67th Sess. (April 21, 1955).
8 The Lincoln Journal, Jan. 14, 1956, p. 2, col. 2; Evening World Herald
(Omaha), Feb. 27, 1956, p. 14, col. 1; Sunday World Herald (Omaha), Feb.
26, 1956, p. 12-B, col. 1. It is reported that the city of Omaha has been
urged to adopt a city ordinance providing for treatment of sex offenders;
The Lincoln Journal, Mar. 19, 1956, p. 14, col. 3.
9 Report of the Committee on Crime and Delinquency Prevention, 28 Neb.
L. Rev. 215, 219 (1949); Report of the Committee on Crime and Delinquency
Prevention, 29 Neb. L. Rev. 192, 193 (1950).
10 Report of the Committee on Crime and Delinquency Prevention, 35 Neb.
L. Rev. 166, 167 (1956).
11 Ibid.
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Psychopath; (2) Commitment; (3) Treatment; and (4) Release.,
I. IDENTIFYING THE SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH
A sexual psychopath as defined in the Nebraska Statute is
"... any person who, by a course of misconduct in sexual matters,
has evidenced an utter lack of power to control his sexual impulses
and who, as a result, is likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury,
loss, pain, or other evil on the objects of his uncontrolled and uncon-
trollable desires."' 3 It should be pointed out at the outset that "sex-
ual psychopath" has no specific medical meaning. There is serious
doubt as to whether the term has any medical meaning at all.
Authoritative statements are found to the effect that the term
has no meaning; to wit:
The diagnosis of psychopathic personality is a convenience in
the institutional practice of psychiatry... Psychopathic personality
satisfies the necessity which is felt to give each patient a label
diagnosis ... Psychiatrists share with other physicians a reluctance
to label a patient "undiagnosed."
Psychopathy does not refer to a specific behaviorial entity. It
serves as a scrap-basket to which is relegated a group of otherwise
unclassifie personality disorders and problems.' 4
Otherwise stated:
... Psychopathic behavior is relative to the culture in which it
flourishes and can be measured by no other rule than that of the
prevailing ethic and morality. So in a society where total abstinence
is mandatory-as among the Brahmins of India-a sign of psycho-
12 The data concerning the sexual behavior, commitment procedures and
the criteria determining release policies were compiled from the records
of the state hospitals. The study of persons committed to the Lincoln
State Hospital was completed on Nov. 30, 1955. The studies at the Norfolk
and Hastings State Hospitals were completed on Jan. 31, 1956, and Feb. 2,
1956, respectively. Any individuals who may have been committed after
the above dates are not included in this article. A personal search of the
files for these records was made at the Lincoln State Hopsital, -while records
of individuals committed to the Hastings and Norfolk State Hospitals
were provided by hospital personnel.
The records of the clerks of the District Courts of Douglas and Lan-
caster Counties on individuals committed were studied. Twenty-six of the
forty-one persons committed under the provisions of the Statute are from
Douglas or Lancaster Counties. Because of the limitations of time and
funds, no effort was made to make a similar study in the twelve other
counties which have committed persons as sexual psychopaths. The article
must be read with this limitation in mind.
13Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2901 (Reissue 1956).
14 Guttmacher and Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law 111 (1st ed. 1952);
cf. Tappan, Some Myths about the Sex Offender, Fed. Prob. 7, 9 (June 1955).
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pathy would be inebriation: and, among the prostitute priestesses
of Astarte, the persistent continence of a beauteous devotee conse-
crated to the distribution of erotic favors would indicate a psycho-
pathic trend. In short, psychopathy is a disorder of behavior whicn
effects the relationship of an individual to the social setting.15
Designated as a "catch-all" diagnosis,16 a vague term represent-
ing a vague concept, 17 it is not surprising to find that there are
recommendations against using the term in statutory language.'8
The latest medical nomenclature excludes the term "psychopathic
personality" entirely.'9
How, then, is the sexual psychopath defined?
There are essentially two elements to the statutory definition
of the sexual psychopath. The first element constitutes a series of
facts, i.e., an utter lack of control of sexual impulses. The second
broad element is comprised of a prediction that the individual,
because of his utter lack of power to control, is likely to attack
or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil. Questions arise
as to what constitutes sexual misconduct, what degree of frequency
and persistency constitutes a course of conduct, and what is the
loss or injury referred to in the Statute. Applying the statutory
definition requires a mixture of moral, legal and medical consider-
ations. To meet these questions, the Statute provides that two
physicians with special training in mental diseases give advice to
the court,20 but the final decision rests with the court or the jury.
A. MISCONDUCT
What type of conduct constitutes "misconduct in sexual mat-
ters"? The Statute gives no definition of this phase. It could ob-
viously encompass a wide range of sexual practices. The language
used in the Nebraska Statute comes from an opinion of the Minne-
sota Supreme Court which originally formulated the definition.21
15 Lindner, Rebel Without a Cause, The Hypnoanalysis of a Criminal Psy-
chopath 1 (1944).
16 Greenacre, Trauma, Growth, and Personality 165 (1st ed. 1952).
17 Guttmacher and Wiehofen, op. cit. supra note 14, at 86, 87.
18 Committee on Forensic Psychiatry of the Group for the Advancement
of Psychiatry Report No. 9, Psychiatrically Deviated Sex Offenders (May
1949, Revised, Feb. 1950).
19 Fahr, Iowa's New Sexual Psychopath Law-An Experiment Noble in
Purpose? 41 Iowa L. Rev. 523, 534 (1956).
20Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2902 (Reissue 1956).
21 Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 205 Minn. 545, 555 (1939);
287 N.W. 297, 302 (1939).
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That Court was of the opinion that it would not be reasonable to
apply the provisions of the definition to every person whose con-
duct was contrary to the accepted norms of sexual activity, nor
to those having strong sexual propensities.2 2 The Court indicated
a much more restricted application, encompassing only those sex-
ually irresponsible persons who were dangerous to others. This
restricted view was approved by the United States Supreme Court
which stated that the class of persons designated as sexual psycho-
paths consisted of those who were a dangerous element in the com-
munity.2 3
There can be little doubt that individuals who seduce children or
who use physical violence in their sexual activities are to be con-
sidered dangerous. But there is a question as to whether persons
who practice homosexuality with adults of like desires and who
do not proselytize among children present a danger to the com-
munity.24 Similarly, those who practice exhibitionism create a re-
pulsive situation, but it has been questioned that they are suf-
ficiently dangerous to justify indefinite commitment. 25
It is not clear whether, under the Nebraska Statute, such activ-
ities as exhibitionism and consensual homosexual relations between
adults are to be considered "misconduct in sexual matters." The
application of the Nebraska Statute apparently varies from county
to county, giving rise to an inference that a difference of opinion
exists among county attorneys on this point. To illustrate the appli-
cation of the Nebraska Statute, the nature of the sexual behavior
of the forty-one persons committed under the Statute has been
22 Ibid.
23 State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 275 (1940).
21 Model Penal Code 276 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The Reporters and the
Advisory Committee of the American Law Institute approved the exclusion
of consensual homosexual relations among adults from criminal punishment.
The fundamental question concerning the right of a person to be pro-
tected from State interference in his personal affairs when he is not hurt-
ing others was raised. The Council of the Institute, however, voted in favor
of criminal punishment. Two reasons for retaining the criminal sanctions
were given by the Council: (1) that although the Reporters' position was
the rational one, it would be unacceptable to the American legislatures and
would prejudice the acceptance of the Code generally; (2) that homo-
sexuality is a cause or symptom of moral decay in a society and should
be repressed by law.
25 Ellis, Psychology of Sex 197 (2d ed. 1946); see California Sexual De-
viation Research 22.
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broken down into six classifications.26 All persons committed, in-
cidentally, have been males. The classifications are as follows:
1. Those persons committed solely for practicing consensual
homosexual activities with partners eighteen years of age or over;
2. Those persons committed for acts of exhibitionism;
3. Those persons committed for sexual activities with partners
of either sex thirteen to eighteen years of age;-'
4. Those persons committed for sexual activities with partners
of either sex under thirteen years of age.
5. Those persons committed for sexual activities involving the
use of force; and
6. Those persons committed for acts of incest.
Table I
This table shows the sexual behavior of persons committed under the
provisions of the Statute and the counties from which they were comr-
mited.
Consensual With Persons With Persons With
County Homosexuality Exhibitionism 13-18 Under 13 Force Incest Total
Douglas 0 6 5 6 1 0 18
Lancaster 1 0 2 4 1 0 8
Lincoln 1 1 0 2 0 0 4
Antelope 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Buffalo 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Dawson 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Dodge 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Hall 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Kearney 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Madison 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Morrill 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Saunders 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Thayer 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Washington 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Totals 3 8 9 15 5 1 41
26 The particular classifications were chosen for a variety of reasons.
First, the separation of those practicing adult consensual homosexuality
were separated due to the difference of opinion within the American Law
Institute. See note 24 supra. The exhibitionist was separated because of the
positions taken by Bowman and Ellis. See note 25 supra. The distinction in
age classifications was made at age eighteen on the basis of the Nebraska
statutory provisions on the age of consent in relation to statutory rape.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-408 (Reissue 1956). The further breakdown at age
thirteen was an arbitrary distinction to distinguish between those who
molested young children from those who nolested older children.
27 Some of these persons may also have had sexual contact with persons
over age eighteen, but all participated in sexual activity involving persons
between age thirteen and eighteen. None in this classification molested
children under age thirteen,
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It will be noted that of the three commitments based on a
history of consensual homosexual activity, none have occurred in
Douglas County, the state's most populous county. This may be the
result of fortuitous circumstances, but a reasonable inference can be
drawn that this activity exists and is not considered there to be
"sexual misconduct" within the meaning of the Statute. On the
other hand, Douglas County has committed six exhibitionists, while
Lancaster County, the state's second most populous county, has
committed none. The same inference would apply here in relation
to Lancaster County's view towards exhibitionism as being miscon-
duct under the Statute.
More than half the total commitments were for acts of sexual
misconduct involving persons under age eighteen. Such sexual
misconduct was probably a major reason for the original proposal
of the Statute.2 Both Douglas and Lancaster Counties, as well as
other less populated counties, have committed persons under the
provisions of the Statute for such acts.
Only five of the forty-one persons committed to the state hos-
pitals as sexual psychopaths had demonstrated patterns of sexual
conduct involving the use of force. In at least one of these five
cases, no force was used in the performance of the act which led
to commitment. One author has said that Nebraska's Statute was
enacted as the result of a forceful sexual assault which produced
public concern.29 It has been said generally that such laws are the
result of "panic" over a few serious sexual assaults.30 With only
about twelve per cent. of the individuals committed being in this
class, it appears that in application the Statute for transcends this
raison d'etre.
B. COUISE OF CONDUCT
The element next to be considered is that of the behavior pat-
tern which constitutes the course of misconduct under the Nebraska
Statute. As with misconduct, there is no amplification within the
Statute of what is meant by course. There is, however, an indication
by the legislature that a liberal interpretation should be given to
this element, suggesting that the number and frequency of the acts
which may constitute a course need not be too great. As originally
enacted, the Statute brought within its purview only those indi-
28 22 Neb. Legis. Council Rep. 38 (1948).
29 Comment, 29 Neb. L. Rev. 506 (1950).
30 Sutherland and Cressey, Criminal Law and Criminology 127 (5th ed.
1955).
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viduals who evidenced an habitual course of misconduct in sexual
matters. The word habitual was deleted by the 1955 legislature.31
In analogous contexts, habitual has been interpreted to mean a fre-
quent practice of an established pattern of behavior requiring
something more than occasional or sporadic acts. 32 But a course of
misconduct also has been held to require continuous practice.33
Judicial interpretations of the two phrases imply that no substantial
change was wrought by the deletion of the word habitual. The
records of those committed before and after the change further
bear this out in that no perceptible change in the application of the
Statute has resulted since the change.34
To determine what application is given to course in Nebraska,
hospital files of those committed under the Statute were reviewed
to determine the behavior patterns which lead to commitment. These
files included statements by the individual, police and F.B.I. re-
ports, and hospital social service reports. The courts making the
commitment may have had more or less information available on
the previous conduct of the person alleged to be a sexual psycho-
path,35 but the hospital files may fairly be expected to be complete
as they are drawn up subsequent to the commitment and serve as
a basis for admission and treatment of the individual. The follow-
ing table gives an indication of the number of acts of alleged mis-
conduct which preceded commitment.
31 Neb. Laws c. 294, p. 999 (1949); amended to strike the word "habitual"
effective September 13, 1955; Neb Laws c. 107, p. 292 (1955).
32 The most analogous is the Texas crime of adultery by habitual carnal
intercourse. Habitual is a word of common acceptation, not of technical
meaning; Hilton v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 190, 53 S.W. 113 (1899). The cases
have made the following decisions on the word. Sporadic or occasional acts,
while perhaps offensive to the moral law are not habitual carnal inter-
course; Lara v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 84, 217 S.W.2d 853 (1949). Two acts
of intercourse on one occasion do not constitute habitual carnal intercourse;
Krolczyk v. State, 125 Tex. Crim. 434, 69 S.W.2d 83 (1934). Two or three
acts do not constitute habitual acts; Haley v. State, 88 Tex. Crim. 51, 224
S.W. 1099 (1920) (dictum). Nine specific acts between Aug. 15 and Dec. 25 is
not habitual carnal intercourse; Cordil v. State, 83 Tex. Crim. 74, 201 S. W.
181 (1918) (semble). Six acts in seven months do not constitute habitual
acts; Boswell v. State, 48 Tex. Crim. 47, 85 S.W. 1076 (1905) (semble). Four
or five instances in one month do not constitute habitual carnal intercourse;
Collins v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. 550, 80 S.W. 372 (1904) (dictum).
33 Dyer v. Dyer, 166 Pa. Super. 520, 72 A.2d 605 (1950) (dictum); Work-
entin v. Kleinwachter, 166 Okla. 218, 27 P.2d 160, 165 (1933) (dictum).
34 Thirty-five of the forty-one persons committed under the Statute
were committed prior to the time the word habitual was deleted.
35 Limitations of time and funds made it impossible to obtain transcripts
of the court proceedings.
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Table 2
This table indicates the number of persons committed and the frequency
of their previous alleged sexual misconduct as evidenced by statements in
hospital records, arrests and convictions. Thus, the number "6" under the
category of "arrests" in the column headed "2 Acts" indicates that six
persons committed had a record of two arrests for sexual misconduct.36
More Than
None 1 Act 2 Acts 3 Acts 4 Acts 4 Acts
Hospital
Records 0 1 6 6 1 27
Arrests 3* 16 6 9 5 2**
Conviction 24*** 8 6 2 0 1***
* In three cases, the records were not clear as to whether there were
any arrests, but appeared to indicate there were none.
* In two instances, the records were not clear, but appeared to indicate
numerous arrests.
* * In two instances, the records were not clear, but appeared to indicate
no convictions.
**** In one instance, the record was not clear, but appeared to indicate
numerous convictions.
Presuming that the committing courts had substantially the
same information to consider as is revealed in the hospital files,
it appears that a very liberal interpretation is given course as used
in the Sexual Psychopath Statute. About one-third of those com-
mitted had three or less acts of alleged sexual misconduct evi-
denced in their records. It is rather difficult to comprehend how
so few acts can be held to show a continuous practice, much less a
pattern which exhibits more than occasional or sporadic acts as
habitual has been interpreted in the Texas statute applying to
"habitual carnal intercourse. '37 While the various elments of the
statutory definition have been fragmentized here for detailed con-
sideration, the context in which these words are found must be
considered. This course of conduct is "to evidence an utter lack of
power to control sexual impulses," in the words of the Statute.
Thus, the context in which the element of course is found lends
weight to strict interpreation of the word. Moreover, language used
by the United States Supreme Court in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson
v. Probate Court may be read to mean that too loose an interpre-
tation of these elements may push such applications beyond the
30 All figures include the alleged act immediately preceding and leading
to commitment.
37 Supra note 32.
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bounds of constitutionality by failing to distinguish adequately the
class to which such statutes apply.38
The sources of information revealing alleged acts of sexual mis-
conduct are divided in the table above into hospital records, arrests
and convictions. The small proportion of persons committed who had
records of convictions indicates merely that if the Statute hinged
commitment on prior convictions for sexual offenses, its application
would be severely restricted.
C. LIKELIHOOD TO ATTACK
The remaining element to be considered under the statutory
definition of the sexual psychopath is that of prediction. The Stat-
ute encompasses the prediction by stating that one who is a sexual
psychopath "has evidenced an utter lack of power to control his
sexual impulses and who, as a result, is likely to attack or other-
wise inflict injury, loss, pain, or other evil on the objects of his un-
controlled or uncontrollable desires." It is from past behavior that
the Statute contemplates such a prediction is to be made.39 It is
doubtful that reasonably accurate predictions of a likelihood to at-
tack can be made even where an attack has been made in the past.4 1
It is still more doubtful that a likelihood to commit a serious sex
crime can be inferred from previous, less dangerous sexual miscon-
duct. Guttenmacher and Weihofen have stated that ".... a graduation
from minor offenses, such as exhibitionism, to major offenses, such
as forced rape, is almost unknown."'4' The histories of those persons
committed to Nebraska hospitals as sexual psychopaths are in keep-
ing with the "non-progression" view. There was no history which re-
flected a progression from minor to serious sex offenses. Some his-
tories revealed an interspersing of acts, some of which were more
dangerous than others, but none showed a sequence of progression
towards more dangerous sexual activity.42
The Statute describes the result of the sexual psychopath's
38 309 U.S. 270, 274 (1940).
39 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2901 (Reissue 1956).
40 Guttmacher and Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law 132 (1952).
41 Guttmacher and Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 40, at 111; cf. Tappan,
Some Myths about the Sex Offender, Fed. Prob. 7, 9 (June 1955).
42 For example, eight individuals were committed for nothing more than
exhibitionism. Only four of the other thirty-three persons committed have
a history of sexual conduct which includes acts of exhibitionism. None of
these four histories indicated a progression from exhibitionism to more
serious sexual misconduct.
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attack in terms of "injury, loss, pain, or other evil." This language
again raises the question as to whether such acts as exhibitionism
and adult consensual homosexuality were intended to be within
resulting acts described in the Statute. The words "other evil"
could reasonably be construed to encompass such acts which are
repulsive, but not physically dangerous to others. While "other
evil" may be so broad as to be almost meaningless, there is other
language which is probably so strict as to be nugatory. The
Statute requires that a person alleged to be a sexual psychopath
must exhibit an "utter lack of power to control his sexual im-
pulses. '43 It has been stated that no psychiatrist would testify that
an individual was utterly lacking in power to control his impulses.44
But in at least one instance in Nebraska, a court-appointed physician
stated that the alleged sexual psychopath had an utter lack of power
to control his impulses. While the ability to control impulses may
vary tremendously, it is virtually impossible to state that some-
one's power is utterly lacking.45 Something less than an utter lack
of power has been accepted in the Nebraska application of the Stat-
ute, but it is impossible to assess with accuracy the degree to which
self-control must be impeded to support commitment.
D. SEXUAL PSYCHOPATHS AND SEX CRIMINALS
All but one of the forty-one persons committed as sexual
psychopaths 46 were committed following an alleged breach of the
criminal law.47 The Statute does not require that a criminal sex
offense precede commitment for sexual psychopaths. As a matter of
practice, however, persons committed as sexual psychopaths usually
came to the attention of the county attorney on criminal matters
and were committed to state hospitals as an alternative method of
dealing with sex offenders. The Statute leaves to the discretion of
43 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2901 (Reissue 1956).
44 California Sexual Deviation Research 19.
45 Ibid.
46 In this case, the behavior leading to commitment appeared to consist
of a single instance of seating a twelve-year-old girl on the offender's
lap, and stroking her head and shoulders. The offender was sixty-nine
years old.
47The violations of the criminal law would consist of the following:
sodomy-13 persons; fondling or debauching a minor-9 persons; statutory
rape-2 persons; felonious assault-5 persons (1 attempted sodomy, 4 at-
tempted rape-2 forcible, 2 statutory); indecent exposure-9 persons;
incest-1 person; possession of obscene literature with intent to exhibit
to minors-1 person. Many of those allegedly committing sodomy could also
have been prosecuted for fondling or debauching a minor.
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the county attorney the question of whether a petition alleging
sexual psychopathy shall be filed.48 Most of the individuals com-
mitted as sexual psychopaths come from either Lancaster or Doug-
las Counties. The county attorneys from these counties were inter-
viewed in an attempt to learn what factors influenced their decisions
to proceed under the criminal law or the Sexual Psychopath Stat-
ute.49 The test apparently in effect in Douglas County is that a first
offender is not considered for commitment as a sexual psychopath;
beyond this no test was elicited other than the statement that each
case is decided on its own merits. In Lancaster County it was indi-
cated that because of the severity of an indefinite commitment, the
Sexual Psychopath Statute was used only when the county attor-
ney was certain in his own mind that the individual was dangerous.
The records of the Nebraska Penitentiary were studied to dis-
cover if there is a discernible difference between the sexual be-
havior of persons committed as sexual psychopaths and the sexual
behavior of those sentenced as "sex criminals."' 0 During the period
covered by this survey, seventy-three persons were sentenced to
the State Penitentiary for sex crimes.51 The application of the Sex-
ual Psychopath Statute in Nebraska indicates that a history of three
acts of sexual misconduct may be adequate to support a commit-
ment under that act. A review of the records of the persons sent
to the Penitentiary during this period shows that at least twenty-six
of these prisoners had histories of sexual misconduct which possibly
could have led to commitment as sexual psychopaths.
There was only one sexual psychopath commitment for incest;
there were six criminal convictions for incest. Two of these six
individuals in prison were given a diagnosis of "sexual psychopath"
by the Penitentiary Medical Board. The Board did not consider
4 8Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2902 (Reissue 1956).
49 Interview with Lancaster County Attorney, Elmer Scheele, Feb. 21,
1956. Interview with Douglas County Attorney, James Fitzgerald, and Dep-
uty County Attorney, Norman Denenberg, Dec. 20, 1955.
50 To make a complete comparison, the records of those persons confined
in the State Reformatory and the various city and county jails throughout
the state would need to be studied. This task was beyond the scope of
the present article. It was thought that a comparison of those persons
in the Penitentiary to those in the state mental hospitals would give a
partial answer to the question.
51 Those sentenced were listed by the Penitentiary in the following
categories: assault with intent to commit rape-3 persons; assault with
intent to commit sodomy-1 person; debauching a minor-4 persons; incest
-7 persons; indecent acts (not further defined)-2 persons; rape-23
persons; sodomy-21 persons; statutory rape-12 persons.
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these persons fit subjects for transfer to mental hospitals, appar-
ently deciding there is no medical basis for committing sexual
psychopaths.G2 There are some indications that this thought is shared
by some mental hospital directors.r3 Two persons were sentenced
to the Penitentiary and three committed as sexual psychopaths for
homosexual acts involving other adults who had consented to the
activity. One of the individuals in the Penitentiary was diagnosed
a sexual psychopath while in prison and transferred to the Hastings
State Hospital. The correspondence in the prisoner's file indicated
that the hospital returned him to the Penitentiary on the ground
that it had neither the personnel nor facilities to handle this type
of patient.54 Three individuals were sentenced to the Penitentiary
for sexual misconduct involving children under thirteen years of
age and ten for acts involving children thirteen to eighteen years of
age. Fifteen of the former and nine of the latter type of offenders
were committed as sexual psychopaths during the same period.
Five individuals who used force in their sexual behavior were sen-
tenced to the Penitentiary. One of the five was examined by the
12 Report of the Penitentiary Medical Board to the Governor of Nebraska:
"We, the Prison Sanity Commission [sic], have today examined inmate....
of the State Penitentiary, and found him to be a sexual psychopath, but not
psychotic. Therefore, he is not properly a patient for a mental hospital
unless committed by a District Court under the Sexual Psychopath Law."
(emphasis added) (Under the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. 83-358 (Reissue
1950), the Penitentiary Medical Board consists of the superintendent of
the Lincoln State Hospital-where a number of "sexual psychopaths" are
housed, the Penitentiary physician, and the director of the Department
of Health.)
53The following is from a "progress note" from the files of the Lincoln
State Hospital regarding a patient released on probation: "As far as his
treatment was concerned during his stay at the hospital there was not
very much to do for him as there is not much treatment for a psychopathic
sexual pervert, but we did what we could in the way of hospitalization."
(emphasis added) See also letter from superintendent of Hastings State
Hospital set out in text page 342, infra.
5 Letter of the former superintendent of the Hastings State Hospital to
the chairman of the Board of Control concerning a Penitentiary inmate
diagnosed a sexual psychopath, and transferred to the Hospital. "It is
quite true we do not have sufficient doctors to give the extensive therapy
he needs. We are, however, doing our best. We have six doctors and 1,700
patients. Treatment of a case like . . . requires extensive therapy over a
long period of time ....
"Our question now is, what do we do? You have his request to be
transferred back to the penitentiary. We do not have sufficient medical
staff to give him the treatment he should have and, frankly we do not
know where to move from here." (This person was returned to the Pen-
itentiary and discharged two months later.)
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Penitentiary Medical Board and diagnosed a psychopathic person-
ality. Another of the five had been previously diagnosed a psycho-
pathic personality at the Douglas County Hospital. Five individuals
who used force were committed as sexual psychopaths. Persons in
both the Penitentiary and the mental hospitals had apparently
committed the offense of forcible or attempted rape.
There appears to be little distinction between the histories
of twenty-six of the individuals sentenced to the Penitentiary and
those committed to state hospitals as sexual psychopaths. For ex-
ample, one "semi-professional" baseball player allegedly used eight
or ten of his young fans in homosexual relations regularly. He
was sentenced to the Penitentiary for sodomy after taking four
boys out in the country and making one boy twelve years of age
perform homosexual acts with him and with another of the boys.
A teacher, committed as a sexual psychopath, allegedly had homo-
sexual relations with two or three of his pupils. The baseball
player was given a ten-year maximum sentence; he served four
years, was paroled, and subsequently given a final discharge. The
teacher faces the potentiality of a lifetime of incarceration. There
are a considerable number of such parallel histories involving
homosexual conduct.
The case of the one person committed as a sexual psychopath
because of incestuous acts has an almost exact duplicate in the Pen-
itentiary. Both cases involved long histories of incest, each involv-
ing two daughters. These similarities and the fact that four prisoners
have been diagnosed as psychopathic personalities while in the Pen-
itentiary indicate that there is little to distinguish the "sexual
psychopath" from the "sexual criminal." However, the difference
in potential length of incarceration can be substantial.
E. SEXUAL PSYCHOPATHY AND OTHER MENTAL ILLS
Another parallel question which arises here is whether a
sexual psychopath may be committed under statutes which provide
for the commitment of the mentally ill. There are indications that
persons were committed to the mental hospitals of this state prior
to the enactment of the Sexual Psychopath Statute on the basis of
sexual misconduct25 A spot check of files of other mental patients
committed subsequent to the passage of the Statute leaves the im-
pression that such commitments still occur. The views here ex-
pressed must be read with the realization that an accurate deter-
mination of these issues would require research far beyond the
55 . Comment, 29 Neb. L. Rev. 506, 509, n. 35 (1950).
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scope of this article plus an ability to interpret medical data, an
ability beyond the training of these writers.
II. COMMITTMENT
The preceding portion of this article dealt with the problem of
defining the sexual psychopath. This problem is obviously an
integral part of the commitment procedure. However, there are a
number of other questions which arise in addition to that of
identifying the sexual psychopath. Three such questions are here
discussed. These problems relate to: (1) the defendant's privilege to
refuse to reveal incriminating facts during court directed medical
examinations; (2) the adequacy of medical reports relating to
examination and diagnosis; and (3) the competency of an individual
to plead guilty to being a sexual psychopath.
A. SELF INCRIMINATION
Commitment procedures provide that court-appointed physi-
cians examine the defendant at least ten days prior to the court
hearing.56 If the physicians find the person is not a sex ual psycho-
path, the proceedings must be halted.57 The Statute is silent as to
what follows if the physicians can make no diagnosis. It would
seem that if an affirmative report of sexual psychopathy cannot be
made, the preceedings must come to an end. Thus, if the defendant
can frustrate the attempts of the physicians to make a diagnosis
by refusing to discuss his past sexual misconduct, he may be able
to thwart the entire proceeding. The Statute indicates that a
personal examination of the defendant is to be the source of infor-
mation upon which the diagnosis is to be made. No statutory pro-
visions are made for the physicians to obtain their information
elsewhere. Furthermore, reputable authority points out that no
diagnosis can be made unless the defendant does discuss his past
sexual behavior.5  It becomes important then to determine whether
the defendant may properly refuse to discuss his past sexual con-
duct with the physicians appointed to examine him.
There are two possible legal bases upon which the defendant
might refuse to discuss his past conduct. First, the Sexual Psycho-
path Statute incorporates that section of the criminal procedure sta-
56Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2902 (Reissue 1956).
G7 Ibid.
58 Sutherland, The Sexual Psychopath Laws, J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 543,
553 (1950).
59 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2904 § 29-2011 (Reissue 1956).
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utes of Nebraska which makes a defendant a competent witness only
upon his own request.5 9 The self-incrimination provision is incorpor-
ated only as to the matter of court proceedings. It would seem that
to give proper effect to this provision, the defendant should be
allowed to raise this defense in the pre-trial examination by physi-
cians. To hold otherwise would be to circumvent the substance
of the Statute through form.
But if the self-incrimination provision as incorporated from the
criminal procedure statutes were to be held not applicable to the
pre-trial medical examination, there is still another basis upon
which the alleged sexual psychopath could refuse to give informa-
tion. This second basis is the general constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination.
The sexual psychopath proceedings are civil in nature, and thus
do not come within the bare words of the Nebraska Constitution
which says:
No person shall be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence
against himself.60
However, both federal6 and state62 courts have construed such con-
stitutional provisions to mean that a defendant need not answer
questions in civil proceedings if such answers might expose the de-
fendant to potential criminal prosecutions. And the prohibition
against self-incrimination is not strictly limited to the giving of
evidence upon the trial of a case or when under oath. It also
applies whenever one is being held by authorities investigating
60 Neb. Const. art. 1, § 12.
Gi McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924); see U.S. v. The Saline
Bank, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 100 (1828) (the Constitution was not discussed).
26 State ex rel. Neilson v. District Court of Eighth Judicial District, 277
P.2d 536 (Mont. 1954) (Mont. Const. art. HI, § 18 provides: "No person
shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal proceeding...");
State ex rel. Reading v. Western Union Tel. Co., 336 Mich. 84, 57 N.W.2d
537 (1953) (Mich. Const. art. I1, § 16 provides: "No person shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to give evidence against himself.. ."); Kindt v.
Murphy, 312 Ky. 395, 227 S.W.2d 895 (1950) (Ky. Bill of Rights § 11 pro-
vides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused cannot be compelled to give
evidence against himself."); People ex rel. Moll v. Danziger, 238 Mich. 39,
213 N.W. 448, 52 A.L.R. 136 (1927) (see for a review of ancient authorities);
Karel v. Conlan, 155 Wis. 221, 144 N.W. 266 (1913) (Wis. Const. art. I § 10
provides: "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself... 55) [overruled on another point, Milwaukee Corrugating
Co. v. Flagge, 170 Wis. 492, 175 N.W. 777 (1920)]; Robson v. Doyle, 191 Ill.
566, 61 N.E. 435 (1901) (Ill. Const. art. II, § 10, "No person shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to give evidence against himself...").
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a charge against the person held.6 It would seem that questions re-
lating to past sexual misconduct would come squarely within the
prohibition against using "compulsion to extort communications"
as defined by Justice Holmes.64
It appears that all but one of the persons committed under
the Nebraska Statute could have been prosecuted under some crim-
inal proceeding for the act which lead to their commitment. Com-
munication by the alleged sexual psychopath to the examining
physician could provide a basis for a subsequent criminal prosecu-
tion.' On this basis, it appears that the defendant could refuse to
discuss his previous misconduct.
The constitutional limitation could be avoided by affording an
immunity from prosecution for matters discussed with the court-
appointed physicians, thus allowing the court to compel answers
under threat of contempt.6 But jailing the alleged sexual psycopath
for refusal to cooperate puts him in jail, instead of a mental hos-
pital, thus defeating one of the aims of such statutes. Moreover,
if the defendant is compelled to talk, the information gained is
of little value. From a medical point of view, any psychiatric evalu-
ation made under threat of contempt charges is invalid.6 7
B. MEDICAL REPORTS
Even where there is cooperation on the part of the person
alleged to be a sexual psychopath, there appears to be a lack of a
133 State v. Taylor, 213 S. C. 330, 49 S.E.2d 289 (1948); State v. Smith, 2J7
Ala. 354, 24 So.2d 546 (1946); Beacham v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. 272, 162
S.W.2d 706 (1942); Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 593, 146 S.W.2d 381
(1941); Blackwell v. State, 67 Ga. 76, 44 Am. Rep. 717 (1881). Contra, State
v. Cox, 87 Ohio St. 313, 101 N.E. 135 (1913).
64 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910). The Federal Constitution
is not binding upon the states however; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
65 Note, however, that an act for which defendant has been indicted and
acquitted may not serve as a basis for commitment. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2902
(Reissue 1956).
00OThe District of Columbia grants statutory immunity from prosecution
upon facts disclosed to the examining physicians. Under this statute refusal
to discuss one's past sexual conduct with the examining physicians con-
stitutes contempt. D.C. Code § 22-3506 (1951). But see State ex rel. Sweezer
v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 232 S.W.2d 897 (1950) where it was held that the
constitutional provision against self-incrimination did not apply as a sexual
psychopath proceeding is civil in nature and not criminal. No immunity is
provided in the Missouri statute. The court did not discuss possible sub-
sequent criminal prosecution.
67 Supra note 58.
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medical diagnosis in some Nebraska cases which resulted in com-
mitment. It was pointed out earlier that the term "sexual psycho-
path" has no specific meaning in the medical field. It is not sur-
prising then to find the court-appointed physicians looking to the
statutory definition for guidance. And from this position it is an
easy step for the physicians to confuse issues and render legal
determinations rather than medical diagnoses. The language of the
diagnoses in two cases reveals that no medical opinion was rendered
at all. In one instance, a physician appointed under the provisions
of the Statute made his diagnosis as follows:
... If ... is guilty of incestuous relations with his daughters,
he would fill the requirements of the sexual psychopath law.
It is apparent here that the physician did not rely upon medical
knowledge; he made a judgment that if the facts alleged were
true, the statutory definition of sexual psychopathy was met. In
another instance a court-appointed physician stated: 68
.. [F]alls within the category of sexual psychopaths as inter-
preted in section 3 of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska Supplement
1947 under 83-322 [sic] and is therefore eligible for commitment to
a state hospital for treatment.
Here again it is apparent that the physician made an attempted
legal, rather than a medical, judgment. In another instance, the
entire physicians' report consisted of the following:
Gentlemen:
We examined Mr.... in the county jail on... pursuant to your
order. He says that he has had sex play with young girls over a
period of about thirty years. He also says that he is unable to control
his sexual attraction to young girls and wishes that there were
some cure for this tendency. We feel that ... is a Sexual Psychopath
and that he is a menace to society.
Very truly yours,
Only in rare instances do the physicians' reports set out specifically
the facts upon which the determination is based. In some instances,
the report consists only of a recitation of the examining physicians'
qualifications and their opinion that the individual examined is
a sexual psychopath. Thus it appears that in some cases there is
no medical opinion given as to the person examined. This situation
could well result from the fact that it is doubtful that the medical
profession is in a position to render the type of opinion contemplated
by the Statute. 9
6s These two statements are not complete reports.
69 Supra note 18, at 1.
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C. PLEA OF GUILTY
In many instances individuals committed under the provisions
of the Sexual Psychopath Statute have been instrumental in effect-
ing their own commitment. Of the eighteen persons committed by
Douglas County, at least ten pleaded "guilty. '70 This practice raises
a question as to the competency of an alleged sexual psychopath
to conclude that he meets the medical and legal definitions of
sexual psychopathy. While an individual may be competent to ad-
mit certain past acts of sexual misconduct,7 1 it is submitted that
he is not competent to determine whether he meets the statutory
requirements of sexual psychopathy. The determination of whether
an individual has evidenced an utter lack of control over his sexual
impulses, or of whether he is likely to attack and inflict injury, loss,
pain, or other evil are determinations which are capable of being
made, if at all, only upon the basis of expert testimony. Legislative
recognition of this is apparent from the statutory requirement that
two physicians with special training in mental diseases be called
upon to assist the court in determining whether an individual is a
sexual psychopath. 72 It is submitted therefore that a court is not
justified in finding an individual to be a sexual psychopath solely
upon a plea of guilty.73
Furthermore, the Statute provides that the physicians "... shall
personally appear and testify at such hearing, at which time counsel
for the alleged sexual psychopathic person may cross-examine..."74
70 In Lancaster County, each of the eight persons committed as sexual
psychopaths joined in the petition filed by the county attorney. In joining
the petition, these individuals stated that the facts alleged were true but
at the same time prayed that the State be required to prove them beyond
a reasonable doubt. This cannot be said to be a plea of guilty; at most it
is a verification of the petition. This practice is apparently followed
to meet the statutory requirement that the petition be verified by one who
has knowledge of the facts. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2902 (Reissue 1956).
71 In habitual criminal cases the defendant is competent to admit his
previous convictions. Glover v. Simpson, 144 Kan. 153, 58 P.2d 73 (1936)
app. denied, 299 U.S. 506 (1936); see State v. Savage, 86 W. Va. 655, 104
S.E. 153 (1920).
72 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2902 (Reissue 1956).
73 The court files do not contain a transcript of the trial or hearing;
therefore, it is not possible to present a detailed discussion of the pro-
cedure actually employed. However, in each of the ten cases where the
defendant pleaded guilty, the personal testimony of the physicians was
waived and in at least one of these cases the filing of a written physicians'
report was also waived. It further appears that no other witnesses were
before the court; thus at least one individual has been committed solely on
the basis of a plea of guilty.
74 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2902 (Reissue 1956).
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The records reveal that in at least seventeen of the cases arising
under the provisions of the Statute, the right to have the physicians
appear at the hearing was waived. It is questionable whether the
alleged sexual psychopathic person can waive the physicians' ap-
pearance. No objection should exist were the court to question the
physician. The statutory language to the effect that physicians are
to be appointed "to assist in the examination" 75 indicates that the
expert testimony is intended as an aid to the court as much as a
protection for the defendant.
III. TREATMENT
Certainly the most distinguishing feature of the sexual psycho-
path statutes is found in the substitution of treatment for punish-
ment. Thus, once an individual is committed under terms of such a
statute, it is contemplated that he will not merely be confined, but
that something will be done to help him overcome his condition.
The problems arising in this area are essentially medical; however,
some legal issues are raised. In the following section, the require-
ment of treatment under the Nebraska Statute is considered, the
treatment policies of the Nebraska state hospitals are surveyed, and
some of the medical authorities are noted to determine what types
of treatment are available.
A. THE REQUIREMENT OF TREATMENT
The Statute provides that "... [The] state hospitals for the men-
tally ill ... shall make adequate provision at such institution to
house such persons and for their medical care while at such institu-
tion. Provision shall be made for detention, housing, care, and
treatment of sexual psychopaths under eighteen years separately
from those over that age. ' 75 (Emphasis added.) This language is
ambiguous for it appears the legislature may have intended treat-
ment only for those under age eighteen. However, the title of the
act indicates that it was the purpose of the legislature to provide
for the treatment of sexual psychopaths in general, and not to limit
treatment to those of a particular age group.77 The Subcommittee on
75 Ibid.
76Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2903 (Reissue 1956).
77 Neb. Laws c. 294, p. 999 (1949) designates: "An act relating to sexual
psychopaths; . . . to provide procedure for commitment of sexual psycho-
paths to state hospitals; to provide for the payment of the cost of mainte-
nance, care, and treatment of such a patient. . ." (Emphasis added) Section
1 of this act also refers to providing treatment for all persons admitted
to state hospitals as provided therein. Sections 3 to 9 of this act are the
Sexual Psychopath Statute.
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Children's Laws considered treatment to be the solution to the prob-
lems presented by sexual psychopaths.78 The Judiciary Committee,
on the other hand, considered the purpose of the Statute to be the
reduction of the number of sex crimes by confining sexual psycho-
paths. 79 The senator sponsoring the Statute indicated that the pur-
pose was to confine if a "cure" could not be effected.80 It is sub-
mitted that the Statute must require treatment. If confinement to
reduce sex crimes were the sole aim of the Statute, it would appear
that a mental hospital is not the proper place to confine these indi-
viduals. This is especially true in light of the fact that almost fifteen
per cent. (six out of forty-one) of those committed to Nebraska hos-
pitals have escaped and are still at large. Moreover, if therapeutic
treatment is not an aim of the Statute, there is little advance over
what could be accomplished by the criminal law.
Some courts have allowed persons committed as sexual psycho-
paths under civil procedures to be shifted to prison cells for in-
definite periods without even a pretense of further treatment.8' Con-
finement of sane persons who are not under sentence for a proven
crime is justifiable only if treatment is given.82 The Circuit Court of
the District of Columbia has indicated that if no treatment is given,
an habeas corpus action is appropriate.8 3 However, the Sixth Circuit
has held otherwise.8 4 The District of Columbia Court construed the
sexual psychopath statute of the District to require treatment, and
indicated that if no treatment had been required, the defendant's
constitutional rights would have been abridged.85 Since the statute
was found to require treatment, the defendant in that case was
78 22 Neb. Legis. Council Rep. 39 (1948).
79 Statement of Judiciary Committee on L.B. 344, Neb. Legis. 61st Sess.
(April 7, 1949).
80 Hearing before Judiciary Committee on L.B. 344, Neb. Legis. 61st Sess.
(March 16, 1949).
8 1 Kemmerer v. Benson, 165 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 849 (1948); State v. Newton, 17 N.J. 271, 111 A.2d 272 (1955); In re
Kemmerer, 309 Mich. 313, 15 N.W.2d 652 (1944).
82Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1953); see dissent in
State v. Newton, 17 N.J. 271, 279, 111 A.2d 272, 277 (1954).
83 Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
84 Kemmerer v. Benson, 165 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 849 (1948).
8 5Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1953). The court
did not explain what constitutional rights would have been impaired. Con-
stitutional objections could be founded upon due process or prohibitions
against involuntary servitude.
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ordered placed in a ward where he would receive such treatment.0
Logically extended, if the Statute did not require treatment, then
an habeas corpus proceeding should result in the freeing of the com-
plainant. The decision implies that without treatment indefinite
confinement, not imposed as punishment, is an unjustifiable use of
the police power .
7
B. TREATMENT PRACTIcES IN NEBRASKA
The writers of this article are not trained in matters pertaining
to the practice of medicine or psychiatry. Accordingly, no effort has
been made to determine from the hospital records what treatment
persons committed in Nebraska's state hospitals as sexual psycho-
paths actually receive. The discussion concerning treatment is based
upon the treatment which the hospital records indicate was recom-
mended by the hospital staff at the time the patient was examined
after admission to the hospital.8 8
Table 3
This table shows the treatments which were recommended by the state
hospitals.
Recommended Hospital
Treatment Lincoln Norfolk Hastings Total
Institutionalization 14 5 7 26
Institutionalization and "some newer drug" 1 0 0 1
Insulin shock 2 0 0 2
Electro shock 0 1 0 1
Insulin shock and electro shock 2 0 0 2
Insulin shock, electro shock,
thorazine, and "any other therapy" 1 0 0 1
Insulin, electro shock, and thorazine 1 0 0 1
Insulin, electro shock, and
"one of the drugs" 0 1 0 1
Tentative frontal lobotomy 1 0 0 1
Individual and group recreational and
occupational therapy 0 1 0 1
Thorazine 1 0 0 1
Psychotherapy 1 1 1 3
Totals 24 9 8 41
86 Id. at 420.
87 See also Petition of Brooks, 5 F.2d 238, 239 (D. Mass. 1925), where the
court said: "There is no power in this court or in any other tribunal in this
country to hold indefinitely a sane person or alien in imprisonment except
as punishment for crime."
88 In thirty-five cases the treatment was recommended by the hospital
staff after a staff meeting. The other six treatments were recommended by
individual physicians, the staff not having made a recommendation,
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Statements were found which reflect the existence of an opinion
among some staff members of at least two Nebraska state hospitals
that no effective treatment for sexual psychopathy exists. The
physician who wrote a "progress note" after an individual com-
mitted under the Statute was released on probation stated: "As far
as his treatment was concerned during his stay at the hospital
there was not very much to do for him as there is not much treat-
ment for a psychopathic sexual pervert, but we did what we could
in the way of hospitalization." In answer to an inquiry from a
brother of a person committed as a sexual psychopath, the superin-
tendent of the Hastings Hospital wrote: "The treatment in cases
like this consists solely in a long program of re-education. There
are no drugs or specific treatment for this type of psychopath.
Actually the hospitalization of such an individual is more a legal
matter than a medical one." (Emphasis added.) In twenty-six cases
institutional care was the only treatment recommended. These indi-
cations tend to show that the medical staffs of the state hospitals
believe little can be done in the way of effective treatment. 9
In one case the treatment recommended consisted of "a long
period of hospitalization ... and perhaps some of the newer drugs
may be of value ..."
In eight cases, shock treatments, employed alone or with other
types of treatment, were recommended. Varying degrees of success
have been claimed for shock therapies.9 0 Bowman reports that the
use of electro shock is being planned for Sing Sing Prison as a means
of treatment, but that at present this type of treatment is essentially
experimental.91 Drummond reports that electro shock treatment has
been tried in cases of homosexuality, but has not proved effective.
92
Guttmaucher and Weihoffen state that there is no rationale for the
use of electro shock as a treatment for sexual psychopaths.
93
A frontal lobotomy was tentatively recommended in one case.
It has been reported that material with which to judge the success
of frontal lobotomies is so scarce that even a tentative judgment as
to its effectiveness is not possible.9 4 Drummond warns of manifold
hazards in the use of frontal lobotomy and states that its use is not
89 For specific statements made by the hospital staffs in seven of those
cases which revealed a general attitude that little can be done for treat-
ment of sexual psychopathy, see Appendix A infra.
en California Sexual Deviation Research 32.
91 Ibid.
92 Drummond, The Sex Paradox 140 (1951).
93 Guttmacher and Weihofen, Psychiatry and The Law 142 (1st ed. 1952).
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sufficiently widespread to be able to gauge its results 5  Weider
states that, "Lobotomy has been considered contra-indicated for con-
stitutional psychopathy associated with cruelty, aggression, irrespon-
sibility and anti-social habits."96
The recommended treatment in one case consisted of "individual
and group recreational and occupational therapy."97 Thorazine, re-
ported as being effective in making patients more receptive to other
treatment,98 was recommended in another case.
In three cases, psychotherapy was recommended. This appears
to be the treatment of choice, but it is costly and the number who
can be helped is small.9 Moreover, there are indications that the
facilities of the state hospitals are inadequate to give this or any
kind of proper treatment. 00
It further appears there is an almost total lack of agreement
among authorities regarding prognosis and treatment of sex offend-
ers.101 One writer states that no definitive psychiatric procedures
for the treatment of psychopathy exist with the result that sexual
psychopaths have tended to be discharged from institutions as the
needs of the institution required, rather than as the condition of the
individual dictated.1 02 Drummond points out that the Ohio Com-
mittee on Psychopathic Personalities found there is at present little
hope for therapeutic results, regardless of the use of any known form
of treatment.10 3 On the other hand, Karpman states that, "Every
psychiatrist of experience and competence has in his records cases
of homosexuality that have been cured, and cases of paedophilia
(sexual attraction toward children), exhibitionism and peeping,
transvestism (cross-dressing or male and female impersonation),
9 4 Bromberg, American Achievements in Criminology, 44 J. Crim. L., C. &
P.S. 166 (1953).
95 Drummond, op. cit. supra note 92 at 81, 140.
96 1 Weider, Contributions Toward Medical Psychology 422 (1953).
97 Some of the cases studied indicate similar treatment was in fact given,
although not originally recommended by the staff. Since the article is
limited to presenting the recommended treatment only, such cases are
not herein described.
98 Drug Changes Mental Hospital Atmosphere, 68 Science News Letter
312 (Nov. 12, 1955). Thorazine is a trade name for chlorpromazine.)
99 Guttmacher and Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 93 at 142; California Sex-
ual Deviation Research 33.
100 Note 54 supra.
101 Drummond, op. cit. supra note 92 at 331.
102 Ploscowe, Sex and The Law 234 (1951).
1
03 Drummond, op. cit. supra note 92 at 56.
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etc., that have definitely yielded to treatment. 10 4 Freyhan is of the
opinion that although a patient may not be cured, he can be taught
to get along in society with the pathologic defect which he possesses
and avoid circumstances with which he cannot cope.10
A review of the Nebraska cases reveals that consistency of rec-
ommended treatment exists neither among the several Nebraska
hospitals nor within a given hospital. A review of the literature in
the field further indicates a lack of agreement among the medical
profession as a whole as to what, if anything, constitutes an effective
treatment for sexual psychopathy.10 6 The courts are not likely to
strike down sexual psychopath statutes as unreasonable in spite of
this lack of agreement. 107 However, this paucity of scientific knowl-
edge undermines the hypothesis that sex offenders are proper candi-
dates for mental treatment. It has been declared that many authori-
ties in both the legal and medical fields think that special sex legis-
lation based on the premise that psychiatric medicine can solve the
problems of sex crimes is premature. 0 8 Psychiatry has been over-
sold in efforts to define legally the sexual psychopath, to predict
who are the potentially dangerous sex offenders, and to obtain per-
manent cures through treatment.10 9 The Supreme Court has indi-
cated that psychiatric diagnosis is so uncertain, and professional
judgment so tentative, that the only certain thing which can be
said about the present state of knowledge and therapy regarding
mental disease is that science has not reached finality of judgment.110
In the absence of an effective treatment for sexual psychopathy, a
major basis for handling certain sex offenders differently than
others vanishes.
IV. RELEASE
Commitments under the Sexual Psychopath Statute are for an
indefinite period. However, the Statute intimates that release of
an individual committed is appropriate in some instances. The fol-
164 Karpman, Sex Life in Prison, 38 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 475, 484 (1948).
105 Freyhan, Psychopathology of Personality Functions in Psychopathic
Personalities, 25 Psychiatric Quarterly 448, 470 (1951).
106 Supra notes 101-105.
1o7 See Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 376 (1956): "Certainly,
denial of constitutional power of commitment . . . ought not rest on dog-
matic adherence to one view or another on controversial psychiatric issues."
108 California Sexual Deviation Research 20.
109 Ibid.
110 Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956).
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lowing section on release deals primarily with two problems: (1) the
statutory requirements upon which release is predicated; and (2)
the release policies of the Nebraska state hospitals.
A. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Statutory provisions relating to the release of persons com-
mitted as sexual psychopaths are not models of clarity. The Statute
provides:
... [Sluch provisions of Chapter 83, article 3, as are not in
conflict with the provisions of this section shall be applicable with
respect to the care and custody of sexual psychopaths; Provided,
that regarding the right of discharge provided by section 83-342, the
superintendent of the institution to which commitment is made shall
make written recommendation for discharge to the court from which
the person was committed. Such court after considering such rec-
ommendation may at its discretion free or release on probation the
person committed." 1
The meaning of the reference to section 83-342 is not clear. This
section refers to the procedure used to notify the clerk of the dis-
trict court when a mental patient is discharged. 11 2 Section 83-340
provides that, "Any patient in a state hospital for the mentally
ill who is cured shall be immediately discharged by the superin-
tendent.' 1 3 According to this provision, it would appear that if
a superintendent deemed a sexual psychopath "cured," he could
discharge him immediately without a court procedure. However,
if this construction were adopted, section 29-2906 of the Sexual
Psychopath Statute would be largely nullified. This section implies
that the committing court must decide when and if an individual
committed as a sexual psychopath shall be released. Section 83-340
is either in conflict with the Sexual Psychopath Statute or is mod-
ified by the reference to 83-342 regarding the "right" of discharge.
If the three relevant sections are read in pari materia, it appears that
the committing court must decide when and upon what conditions
one committed under the Statute shall be released. The hospital
"'Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2906 (Reissue 1956).
112Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-342 (Reissue 1950) provides: "When a patient is
discharged from the hospital by the authorities thereof, whether with or
without application therefor, notice of the order of discharge shall at once
be sent by the superintendent of such hospital to the clerk of the district
court of the county from which the patient was committed. The county
board of mental health shall forthwith cause such patient to be removed
and at once provide for the care of such person in the county, as in other
cases, unless such patient is discharged as cured. The clerk of the district
court shall, upon receipt of the notice of the order of discharge, enter
the same upon the records of such office."
1 3 Neb. Rev. Stat. (Reissue 1950).
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records reveal that some individuals committed as sexual psycho-
paths have been released without court approval. Generally, how-
ever, the approval of the court was received before releases were
effected.
Assuming that the Statute requires court approval, what re-
quirements must be met as a condition precedent to release? The
Statute provides only that the superintendent make a written recom-
mendation for discharge; the court after considering this recom-
mendation may in its discretion release the committed person. The
Statute does not provide the court with any criteria as to when
release is appropriate.
One transcript of a release proceeding was available for study.
This proceeding was initiated in the form of a petition to modify
the commitment order. An earlier proceeding had failed on the
ground that the superintendent of the Lincoln State Hospital did
not recommend a discharge. At the second proceeding the super-
intendent appeared as a subpoened witness and testified that in
his opinion there was "a possibility that this young man may here-
after make a good social adjustment, or at least his capabilities
would be increased." He did not assure a complete cure, but signed
a statement reciting, "In view of the above evidence which I have
heretofore given, I hereby recommend the discharge from the
State Hospital of . . . under such terms and conditions as the
court may wish to impose upon him if any." The court released the
individual on probation.
A letter from a former Hastings State Hospital superintendent
to a district court reveals a test in conflict with that of the Lincoln
Hospital. The letter stated that the patient in question had made
a good adjustment in the hospital and might make a good adjust-
ment in society, but that the superintendent was not able to say
the patient was "cured." No recommendation for release was made.
When the reason for commitment to a mental institution no
longer exists, the individual should be released." 4 Persons com-
mitted to mental hospitals in Nebraska have the right of habeas
corpus and the right is made applicable to persons committed as
sexual psychopaths." 5 Since sexual psychopathy as defined by the
Statute requires that one must have "evidenced an utter lack of
power to control his sexual impulses,"" 6 it may be argued that
whenever an individual no longer manifests such behavior he is no
114 Durham v. CaUahan, 42 Wash.2d 352, 255 P. 2d 374 (1953).
115 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2906 (Reissue 1956); see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-343
(Reissue 1950).
116 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2901 (Reissue 1956).
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longer within the purview of the Statute and must therefore be
discharged.
B. RELEASE POLICIES
It becomes apparent that there are several criteria upon which
release plausibly could be predicated. To determine what test or
tests are employed in Nebraska, a search of the hospital files of
those individuals released was made. Eleven of the forty-one in-
dividuals committed during the period covered by this survey have
been released;"" four were discharged, and seven were released
on probation. An effort was made to determine what factors in
the histories of these individuals were related to their release.
The prognosis, or the forecast of the probable course and term-
ination of the patient's condition, appeared to have no important
bearing upon his subsequent release. Four persons were released
who were given a prognosis of "guarded," four were released whose
prognosis were "poor," and two "hopeless" patients were released.
One of those released was never given a prognosis.
Save for the one person committed upon a history of incestuous
activity, there have been releases from each of the sexual conduct
classifications presented in Table 1, supra. Thus it appears that the
type of sexual conduct which led to the commitment of the indiv-
idual was not a determining factor.
As discussed above, the relationship of "cure" to release is dif-
ficult, perhaps impossible, to determine. In one instance, the hos-
pital record indicated that the patient had reached maximum im-
provement. In another instance, the record stated no reason for
release, but did indicate that the patient expressed a desire to leave
the state. One record gave no indication at all as to the reason for
the release.
In six cases, the hospital records showed that efforts were made
by outsiders to obtain the release of the individuals concerned. In
two such cases, the efforts were expended by lawyers, in two
others, by relatives who welcomed the patients into their homes
outside Nebraska. In the remaining two cases where outsiders
worked for release, efforts were made by a friend in one and by the
patient's wife in the other. It appeared in these six cases that the
most compelling factor involved in the release was the efforts
expended by outsiders.
117 The Lincoln State Hospital has discharged or released on probation
four of the twenty-four "sexual psychopaths" committed. The Hastings Hos-
pital has released one of eight such persons. The Norfolk State Hospital
has released six of the nine "sexual psychopaths" committed to its custody.
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There were two releases in which no active effort was made
by outsiders, but families of the patients were receptive. There were
no medical reasons assigned for the release in these cases.
The following cases illustrate the above observations:
The hospital record indicates A practiced homosexuality with
adults and with boys thirteen years of age and over. He was com-
mitted to the Norfolk State Hospital and given a "hopeless" prog-
nosis. The staff's recommendation as to treatment began with the
statement, "No treatment will alter this man's attitude.. ." A was
released on probation after five months to a sister in New York
who had, in letters to the hospital, indicated a Willingness and desire
to have her brother live in her home. Four months after his proba-
tion began, A was discharged.
B was committed to the Norfolk State Hospital. His record
reveals he practiced homosexuality with boys over thirteen years
of age. In giving B a prognosis, it was stated, ". . . it is doubtful he
will be able to overcome his sexual deviation." B was discharged
two months later; no specific reason for his release was stated in
the hospital record.
After an arrest for statutory rape, C was committed to the
Norfolk State Hospital. C's history shows that he practiced fellatio
and cunnilingus. His wife stated he used physical force upon her
when she refused his requests to practice cunnilingus upon her, or
when she refused his requests for normal intercourse. The hospital
record indicated C was a "hopeless" patient. One year after com-
mitment C was released on probation to a sister in Colorado who
had corresponded with the hospital and indicated a willingness
to have her brother live in her home." 8
Only six of the thirty persons who are presently confined
have had efforts expended on their behalf in attempts to secure
release. In one of the six cases, an attorney, after two court hear-
ings, was successful in obtaining a release for his client. However,
this patient was returned to the hospital for allegedly attempting
to entice small girls into his car. In three cases, attorneys' efforts
to secure releases of their clients were interrupted; two by escape,
one by death. In addition to these four cases, the friends or family
of two patients have shown active interest in securing the patients'
releases; in one of these cases the county attorney involved ex-
pressed opposition to having the patient released to his county. It
would appear that where efforts of outsiders to obtain release
118 See Appendix B, infra, for case histories of eight other persons who
were released.
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have not been successful, some extraneous factor, such as escape
or positive objection, has intervened in almost every instance. 19
A rational criteria for release, related in some manner to the
reason for commitment, requires some type of valid prediction as
to the individual's future behavior. But it appears that science is
not yet prepared to provide decisive answers to such questions.
When the bases for release are so uncertain, legislation which per-
mits individuals to be confined for indeterminate periods is, at best,
a dangerous experimentation with individual liberty.
V. CONCLUSION
The Sexual Psychopath Statute rests upon a faith in modern
psychology and psychiatry. It is founded on two assumptions: (1)
that "sexual psychopaths" can be identified, and (2) that they can
be treated successfully and returned to society. In theory the Stat-
ute would seem well advised. In fact, it is found that medical science
is dubious of its own ability to diagnose sexual psychopath. The
existence of an effective treatment is equally doubtful.
This lack of scientific knowledge is reflected in the confusion
evidenced among the Nebraska hospitals. Various therapeutic treat-
ments of questionable efficacy are recommended. Release policies
are inconsistent. While one hospital releases a patient who has a
possibility of making a successful adjustment, another hospital is
unwilling to release one who might make a good social adjustment
because he is not "cured." While one hospital may confine for life
a person with a "hopeless" prognosis, another hospital may release
such a patient within a few months.
The problems raised by the Statute project themselves into the
legal profession also. Prosecuting attorneys find it impossible to
distinguish rationally between sexual psychopaths and other sexual
offenders. Individuals with similar patterns of conduct may thus
be prosecuted criminally or be committed to a state hospital. While
one faces a fixed maximum term of incarceration, the other faces
a possibility of indefinite confinement.
It is submitted that the present status of medical and legal
knowledge does not provide an adequate basis for this departure
from the traditional criminal methods of dealing with individuals
whose sexual conduct does not meet with social approval.
Domenico Caporale, '57
Deryl F. Hamann, '58




The following are statements which were a part of the recommended
treatment for seven persons committed as sexual psychopaths. These state-
ments reveal little enthusiasm as to the possible success in treating such
patients. Recommended treatments in some other cases reflected a more
hopeful attitude. Of the seven cases dealt with below, four are still confined,
two have escaped and remain at large, and one has been discharged.
Of the patient discharged, the staff made this statement when it recom-
mended treatment: "No treatment will alter this man's attitude ... " Just
five months later, this man was released.
1: "Since he was committed by the Courts, we have no choice but
to keep him here, probably indefinitely the remainder of his natural days.
Perhaps after he has been here six months to a year he may be given a
ground parole and put to work and be made a useful hospital citizen
somewhere."
2: "Keep the patient here for a while as long as we have to. Petition
the Court and perhaps under supervision and restriction he may be able
to adjust in society and get along and eliminate his past behavioral reac-
tions."
3: "... [W)e do not expect him to learn from hospitalization except
for confining him and protecting society from his activities."
4: "Keep in the institution for a while until such time as we can
recommended his parole to the judge. . . . [H]e could probably be given a
ground parole and put to some useful use around the institution."
5: "Because of his inability to learn, this man will probably have
to be maintained in an institution for the remainder of his years. It is felt
that if he were allowed to go back into society, and if he had the oppor-
tunities, he would do the same things which he did prior to coming to
us. However, it is felt that he should be allowed to go to the various
institutional programs and activities, providing he does not get too excited
and his conduct is such that it does not embarrass anybody."
6: "Keep him in the institution as long as the Court desires. I suppose
after a number of months if he continues to adjust as well as he has
in the past he can be given more liberty and more freedom around the
institution and be made a more useful citizen to the hospital population."
7: "No treatment will alter this man's attitude. All that can be
done is to advise him to control his sexual desires but in view of the fact
that he is resentful about society's interference, it is unlikely that this
advice will be of much use to him."
Appendix B
The following are brief case histories of eight persons who have
been released following commitment as sexual psychopaths. The three other
persons who were released during the period covered by this article are
dealt with in the text, page 348, supra.
D was committed to the Norfolk State Hospital. His history shows
repeated instances of exhibitionism. Shortly after admission, D was given
a guarded prognosis. The hospital record indicated D had made a "good
social adjustment" and that he expressed a desire to move to Colorado.
Eleven months after commitment he was released on probation to his
wife; three months later he was discharged.
Consensual homosexuality led to E's commitment at the Lincoln
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State Hospital. A progress note dated some two and one-half years after
commitment indicated that everything in the way of hospitalization had
been done ("as there is not much treatment for a psychopathic sexual
pervert"). E, after one unsuccessful attempt, secured a release through the
efforts of his attorney. At the hearing, the hospital superintendent refused
to say that E was "cured," but only that there was a possibility that he
might make a good social adjustment. This person had been given a poor
prognosis.
Homosexual practices with minors thirteen years of age and over led
to F's commitment at the Lincoln State Hospital. No prognosis was made. A
progress note dated ten months after commitment indicates that he had one
homosexual experience while at the Hospital. Thirty-three months after
commitment he was released on probation for a period of three weeks.
Social Service reports made during this period of time stated there were
no instances of sexual misconduct. Four months later, he was released on
probation.
Homosexual and heterosexual practices with children under thirteen
years of age led to the commitment of G who was given a prognosis of
guarded by the Lincoln State Hospital. Two years after his commitment,
a staff statement was recorded to the effect that it was felt G had probably
reached his maximum improvement as far as hospitalization was concerned.
One month later, G was released on probation. A year after this release,
G was returned to the Hospital by a court order for re-evaluation. This
appears to have resulted from complaints that G had been molesting
young girls. G was again released on probation five months later.
H was committed to the Norfolk State Hospital because of a history of
consensual homosexuality with adults. He was given a prognosis of poor.
A report of the hospital psychology department stated that the patient
could function on the outside if he were in an environment where no undue
stress was placed upon him. Fourteen months after commitment he was
released on probation to a friend who had previously made known his
willingness to have H live in his home.
Acts of exhibitionism led to the commitment of I at the Norfolk State
Hospital. The physicians who wrote I's clinical history noted that the
patient "shows an entire lack of control over his abnormal sex impulses."
He was given a guarded prognosis. Less than a year after commitment I was
released on probation.
Exhibitionism likewise led to the commitment of J. The Lincoln State
Hospital gave him a prognosis of poor. The hospital record indicates that
some five months after commitment, J's wife stated she was contemplating
some action to secure J's release. J was released on probation one year
after commitment.
Twenty years of fellatio and pederasty and several instances of at-
tempted statutory rape led to the commitment of K. The Hastings State
Hospital gave him a prognosis of poor. The Hospital record reveals numerous
efforts by both the patient's family and attorney to secure K's release.
Thirty-two months after K's commitment he was released on the authority
of a staff physician without benefit of court procedures. Less than two
months prior to K's release the acting superintendent of the Hospital had
specifically refused to recommend a release to the court. It appears the
release was effected in ignorance of this refusal, and without the acting
superintendent's concurrence or knowledge.
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Appendix C
The following reveal the histories of individuals who are still confined
in state hosiptals. Certain of these cases reveal conduct which could ration-
ally support a recommendation for release in view of the releases allowed.
See Appendix B, supra. In none of the following illustrations have there
been any efforts expended by persons outside the hospital to obtain the
release of the individual concerned.
In 1953, L was committed following an act of sodomy with a sixteen-
year-old boy. Shortly ofter commitment, the Lincoln Hosiptal staff re-
ported his prognosis as guarded. "He will probably never change his
fundamental personality or methods of reacting to other people." In De-
cember of 1954, however, a note was made to the following effect: "It is
felt by the examiner that this patient has shown for the last four months an
attitude which is consistent with his successful behavior on the outside,
and it is felt advisable that some arrangement be made that he be paroled
from this institution." "He has made no homosexual advances towards
any of the other patients." There was no further information recorded
regarding his behavior. Why L was not released does not appear. L was
unmarried, and had not been in the state very long. No efforts to procure his
release by any interested party appear from the record. Apparently the
hospital staff never acted on the above recommendation.
After four or more instances of indecent exposure, M was committed to
the Lincoln State Hospital in 1953. The Hospital prognosis was that: "We
can do nothing for his mental condition. Whether we can teach him with
Electro Shock treatment or any other treatment to control his impulses to
expose himself, we do not know." Staff notes indicated that no anti-social
behavior except exposing himself was found. No record of assistance by
anyone interested in securing M's release was discovered in the records.
It was reported that M had "gotten along well" and had given no trouble
in his care. He is still confined.
N was likewise commited to the Lincoln State Hospital after four or
more acts of indecent exposure. The staff's comment on this individual
was 'Keep the patient here for a while, as long as we have to. Petition
the Court and perhaps under supervision and restrictions, he may be able
to adjust in society and get along and eliminate his past behavioral reac-
tions." A state senator inquired about N, but upon finding he was committed
as a sexual psychopath, lost all interest. N is still confined; apparently the
Hospital has not kept him yet "as long as [they] have to."
Of 0, the Lincoln State Hospital reported: "So far as we are able to
learn, he has never been aggressive sexually. His only crime is masturbating
in public and in the presence of the opposite sex." 'We do not know how he
will progress, or what will happen to him." (Emphasis added.) No inter-
vention by parties interested in securing a release for 0 appear in the records
apparently it is still not known what will happen to him.
At the age of sixty-nine, P was committed to the Hastings State Hos-
pital. His prognosis was reported as guarded. His offense appears to con-
sist of one instance of picking up a twelve-year-old girl and seating her
on his lap. He patted or stroked her head and shoulders. The patient's daugh-
ter wanted P to live with her, but P was not released. The former superin-
tendent of the Hospital in a message to the district judge from which P was
committed, indicated that while P might make a good adjustment on the
outside, that he was not ready to say P was "cured." P died in the Hospital
not long afterward.
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An act of sodomy involving a boy under age thirteen, coupled with the
molesting of two seven or eight-year-old girls led to the commitment of Q.
His record also showed one instance of exhibitionism. A meeting of the
staff of the Lincoln State Hospital resulted in the statement that "This
patient will have to be kept out of society probably for the remainder of
his natural days." He was given a prognosis of hopeless. Only recently com-
mitted, no intervention to effect his release had yet been forthcoming.
